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Multiverse Views in set theory advocate the claim that there are many uni-
verses of sets, no-one of which is canonical, and have risen to prominence over
the last few years. One motivating factor is that such positions are often argued
to account very elegantly for technical practice. While there is much discussion
of the technical aspects of these views, in this paper I analyse a radical form of
Multiversism on largely philosophical grounds. Of particular importance will be
an account of reference on the Multiversist conception, and the relativism that it
implies. I argue that analysis of this central issue in the Philosophy of Mathemat-
ics indicates that Radical Multiversism must be algebraic, and cannot be viewed as
an attempt to provide an account of reference without a softening of the position.
Keywords: Philosophy of mathematics, set theory, foundations of mathematics, mul-
tiverse
Introduction
The development of set theory since the 1930s has been partly shaped by a fascinat-
ing phenomenon: independence results. Since Go¨del’s proof of the consistency of
the Axiom of Choice and Continuum Hypothesis with Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory,
various model-theoretic techniques (notably the method of forcing developed by Co-
hen) have allowed us to show that for many sentences of set theory φ, it is neither
the case that ZFC ` φ nor ZFC ` ¬φ. The case is particularly acute in set theory,
as the kinds of statements that turn out to be independent from ZFC are extremely
natural questions, rather than gerrymandered statements of metalogic (such as the
Go¨del sentence for Peano Arithmetic). While the most infamous example is probably
the Continuum Hypothesis, the phenomenon is visible with respect to a wide range
of mathematical entities. So Hamkins writes:
“A large part of set theory over the past half-century has been about con-
structing as many different models of set theory as possible, often to ex-
hibit precise features or to have specific relationships with other models.
Would you like to live in a universe where CH holds, but ♦ fails? Or
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where 2ℵn = ℵn+2 for every natural number n? Would you like to have
rigid Suslin trees? Would you like every Aronszajn tree to be special?
Do you want a weakly compact cardinal κ for which ♦κ(REG) fails? Set
theorists build models to order.” ([Hamkins, 2012b], p417)
There have been (broadly speaking) two reactions to this phenomenon. On the
one hand, some regard these results as indicative of a failure of bivalence in set the-
ory. Others, however, prefer to maintain that these sentences nonetheless have a
definite truth value.
In this paper I am primarily concerned with one view that regards some sen-
tences of set theory as non-bivalent. This is Joel David Hamkins’ recently proposed
and technically elegant ‘Multiverse View’, given in [Hamkins, 2012b]. I shall ar-
gue that Hamkins’ position may be interpreted in one of two ways, either as giv-
ing an account of ontology and reference (with similarities to the ideas present in
[Balaguer, 1998]), or alternatively as providing a framework for understanding set
theory algebraically. Taking Hamkins’ view in the former way, I suggest, leads to a
referential regress: on a given occasion of purported set-theoretic reference there is
a vicious non-well-founded dependency chain. A similar problem, I argue, can be
pressed against Hamkins concerning various metalogical notions. Analysis of these
problems reveals that if the Hamkinsian Multiversist wishes to have her view inter-
preted ontologically, she1 has to de-radicalise some of her theses. My strategy is as
follows:
In section 1 I outline the version of Multiversism under consideration (given in
[Hamkins, 2012b]) and some of its theoretical motivations. I note that there are at
least two ways of interpreting his view: either as providing a philosophical view of
ontology, or specifying an algebraic framework for the practice of set theory. On the
former interpretation, I note that the method by which we refer to the subject matter
of mathematics is usually through description, and is often argued to solve a problem
present in [Benacerraf, 1973]. In section 2 I point out that this way of interpreting
Hamkins’ Multiverse View leads to a very strong form of relativism. I then use this
to develop a regress, one which I argue is vicious. Further analysis reveals that if we
wish to refer to mathematical objects in a philosophically satisfactory manner, a core
of concepts must be taken to be determinately understood. Section 3 then examines
some consequences of this relativism for the study of metalogic. It is argued that the
inability of the Multiversist to provide a characterisation of finitude appears deeply
problematic and is further evidence that if we are to maintain an account of reference,
then certain mathematical notions must be kept absolute. In section 4 I argue that the
algebraic interpretation does not suffer from these difficulties, but note that it does
not provide an answer to Benacerraf’s problem.
It is concluded that the Hamkinsian Multiversist must either soften her position
to include some concepts as determinately understood, or alternatively take her view
to be one not concerned with ontology and reference.
1 The Radical Multiverse View
To see from where the Multiverse View gains its motivation, it will be useful to first
examine its polar opposite. Pre-theoretically, once we have accepted the Iterative
1In order to disambiguate, throughout this paper I speak as if the Hamkinsian Multiversist is female
and her opponents are male (with the exception of Hamkins himself).
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Conception of Set as the conceptual underpinning of ZFC set theory2 it is natural to
hold the following view:
[Universism] There exists a single, unique, maximal, determinate uni-
verse of sets, to which we may refer precisely using our set-theoretic con-
cepts (all of which, in turn are determinate3).
Universism thus ensures that every statement of set theory is determinately true
or false, we have a determinate ontology and concepts that we can use to refer pre-
cisely to said ontology. The Multiversist takes it, however, that there are good rea-
sons to reject Universism. In particular I will be concerned with a very radical form
of Multiversism given in [Hamkins, 2012b]. A main argument of this paper will be
that the position can be interpreted in different ways. For this reason, we begin with
a coarse grained characterisation of his view and refine it later.
Explaining his philosophical standpoint, Hamkins writes:
“As a result [of the independence phenomenon], the fundamental objects
of study in set theory have become the models of set theory, and set the-
orists move with agility from one model to another.” ([Hamkins, 2012b],
p418)
In order to arrive at a first approximation, I shall take this as an initial statement
of Hamkins’ view. He claims the fundamental objects of set-theoretic study are the
models of different set theories. This characterisation immediately raises the follow-
ing question: what theory should these models satisfy?
For the purposes of this paper, we shall take the models to satisfy first-order
ZFC. There are two reasons for this choice. First, while Hamkins is potentially open
to the consideration of different multiverses (such as the multiverse of second-order
arithmetic), it is ZFC set theory with which he is primarily interested. Second, the
theory must be first-order as Hamkins holds that our interpretation of second-order
variables requires a background set theory. For this reason, he holds that indetermi-
nacy in first-order ZFC would transfer to the second-order setting.4
Thus, we arrive at the following initial characterisation of Hamkins’ position:
[Hamkinsian Multiversism] There is no one universe of sets, but rather
many. A universe of sets is simply a model of first-order ZFC.
A remark on terminology is important here. The Multiversism in question must
be specified to be Hamkinsian, as there are many Multiverse views, each of which
takes different concepts to be determinate. For example, a Zermelian form of Mul-
tiversism normally holds questions of ‘height’ (i.e. the ordinals that exist) to be in-
determinate, but questions of ‘width’ (i.e. the subsets formed at Vα+1 given some
Vα) to be determinate.5 On such a picture the universes are the natural models
2We should be mindful here of the fact that the idea of the Iterative Conception underpinning ZFC
set theory is quite controversial in itself. There is an extensive literature on the topic, for a small selection
see [Maddy, 1988] and [Potter, 2004]. I do not address the question further here, and take it as assumed
that the Iterative Conception is the justificatory resource to which the Universist appeals.
3It should be noted that there is the scope to hold that there is just one Universe of sets but that it is
indeterminate in some sense (say because, some of its properties are indeterminate). For just such a view,
see [Feferman, 2011].
4This fact will turn out to be important for assessing Hamkins’ view, and is discussed in more detail in
§3.
5The idea has its conceptual roots in [Zermelo, 1930], but see also [Isaacson, 2011].
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of second-order6 ZFC2. Hence, questions concerning the low levels the hierarchy
(such as CH) are determinate: the relevant Vκ is the same in every natural model
of ZFC2. Many questions of height (such as the existence of an inaccessible car-
dinal) turn out to be indeterminate, as there are usually some models of ZFC2 in
which there are no cardinals of the required variety (for example, the smallest model
of ZFC2 does not contain an inaccessible). Conversely, we might hold a version of
Multiversism on which questions of height are determinate, but questions of width
(for example the Continuum Hypothesis) are indeterminate (such a view is advo-
cated by [Steel, 2014]). Here, our universes would be the models which contain all
the ordinals, including their inner models and (set) forcing extensions. Hamkinsian
Multiversism represents a very extreme position in this regard, a universe on his
view is simply any structure that satisfies first-order ZFC.
In order to understand what is at stake for the Hamkinsian Multiversist, I ex-
plain three motivations that have been given for the view: (1.) the generality of
forcing constructions, (2.) the avoidance of arbitrariness, and (3.) the possibility of
additional mathematical insight.
1.1 The generality of forcing
Universism, it might be argued, faces a substantial challenge in the form of the in-
dependence results. It is not simply the fact that there are statements that are inde-
pendent (a fact that, though it requires explanation, may be dismissed as a side issue
about the paucity of our proof-theoretic framework), but rather the manner in which
these results are proved.
The issue is the following. Set-theoretic practice is replete with model-theoretic
techniques that, given a particular model of set theoryM, ‘add’ sets not already inM
toM. The clearest technique with which this is visible is forcing. In order to force over
a particular model of set theoryMwe begin with a partial orderP = 〈P,<P,1P〉 ∈M.
We then choose a filter G on P that intersects every dense subset D of P that lies in
M. Next, we add G to M and close under set-theoretic operations definable in M.
The end result is a new modelM[G] that (given the correct choice of partial order)
satisfies the axioms and the appropriate sentence for the independence proof. Im-
portantly, however, G 6∈ M for non-trivial forcing constructions.7 The challenge for
the Universist lies in the fact that often set theorists will force using ‘V ’ to denote the
ground model. Normally, ‘V ’ denotes the universe of all sets. Since the set added
(call it ‘G’) cannot be in the model over which we are forcing, the Universist faces a
problem. For, it appears that they should say that the statement “there is a forcing
extension V [G] such that...” is true: many forcing constructions make just this claim
and the mathematics in question appears perfectly rigorous and consistent. How-
ever, while G is a set, G cannot be in V by construction, but V is supposed to be all
the sets there are. It looks as though something has to give.
At this point, it should be noted that the Universist has several quite robust op-
tions involving complex simulations of the statements in question. He could, for ex-
ample, use the Reflection Theorem in conjunction with the Downward Lo¨wenheim-
Skolem Theorem to obtain a countable structure over which he can force.8 Alter-
natively, he could interpret the forcing via Boolean-valued models (or if she wishes
6This is only true, of course, if we are allowed to use the ‘full’ semantics for ZFC2. See
[Meadows, 2013] and [Koellner, 2013] for discussion of the surrounding philosophical issues.
7For details see [Kunen, 1980] and [Jech, 2002].
8In particular, this strategy seems attractive for the reason that often use of the term ‘V ’ is patently an
abuse of notation, designed to underscore the fact that any countable transitive model will suffice for the
construction. See [Koellner, 2013] for discussion of some of these issues.
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to interpret the reasoning in a two-valued manner, use a Boolean ultrapower and
quotient structure9). Still further, he could analyse the problematic statements syn-
tactically using the forcing relation.
All this is satisfactory as far as it goes, and allows the Universist to interpret
forcing talk where the symbol ‘V ’ is used. The Multiversist rejoinder, however, is
that it seems arbitrary to insist that V does not have a forcing extension where the
relevant notions seem perfectly well defined. The issues here are subtle and complex,
and I defer consideration of Universist interpretations of forcing to different work.
Suffice to note for current purposes that the Universist has to provide a complex and
detailed paraphrase strategy in interpreting this set-theoretic discourse.
This is precisely what is not required under Hamkinsian Multiversism, however.
For her, the account of set-theoretic forcing is as follows. We start with a particular
set-theoretic background, that we take to be ‘all’ the sets and dub this model ‘V ’.
Then, when we perform the sorts of model-theoretic constructions that necessitate
the addition of sets to the model, we simply move from V to a different (equally
legitimate) universe of sets that may (and usually does) satisfy very different sen-
tences. We do not have to provide any awkward paraphrase, rather, we can hold that
when a set theorist asserts statements about ‘the universe’ V and moves to a forcing
extension V [G], she begins by considering some particular universe and then shifts
reference to a different universe (i.e. the forcing extension). Where the Universist has
to use a paraphrase strategy to interpret the claim “V has a forcing extension V [G]
such that...”, the Multiversist can simply assert that reference is entirely transparent:
she begins by referring to a perfectly real and legitimate universe, and then simply
shifts reference to an equally real and legitimate universe. In short, the Hamkin-
sian Multiversist contends that she avoids insisting in an ad hoc fashion that V has
no forcing extension, she can hold any construction involving the term ‘V ’ to have
perfectly good and transparent ontological reference.
1.2 The avoidance of arbitrariness
The forcing construction provides a clear example of where Universism has ques-
tions to answer in interpreting set-theoretic discourse. However, the problem is in-
dicative of a wider issue in set theory:
“the most prominent phenomenon in set theory has been the discovery of
a shocking diversity of set-theoretic possibilities. Our most powerful set-
theoretic tools, such as forcing, ultrapowers, and canonical inner models,
are most naturally and directly understood as method of constructing
alternative set-theoretic universes.” ([Hamkins, 2012b], p418)
The point here is fairly simple: while forcing presents the most obvious conflict
with Universism (in virtue of adding sets to the ground model) it nonetheless re-
mains the case that there are many constructions that can be naturally understood
from a Hamkinsian Multiversist perspective. Any particular ZFC-preserving con-
struction can be interpreted as movement within the Multiverse. The Universist,
in virtue of holding that there is a unique privileged Universe of set theory, has
to explain why the seemingly perfectly natural set-theoretic constructions produce
nothing more than model-theoretic representations within V rather than bona fide
universes. Again, the issues here are subtle and a full consideration is outside the
scope of this paper.10 However, we should note that the Hamkinsian sees it as a
9For details, see [Hamkins and Seabold, 2012].
10Again, some of these issues are given consideration in [Koellner, 2013].
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substantial theoretical virtue that she can interpret set theorists as concerned simply
with other models that are fully legitimate universes in their own right, rather than
having to provide a philosophical analysis of the difference between V and these
other structures.
1.3 Additional mathematical insight
The final reason I shall mention here is that (Hamkins claims) the Universist runs the
risk of missing mathematical insights. He argues as follows:
“Such a perspective may be entirely self-consistent, and I am not argu-
ing that the universe view is incoherent, but rather, my point is that
if one regards all outer models of the universe as merely simulated in-
side it via complex formalisms, one may miss out on insights that could
arise from the simpler philosophical attitude taking them as fully real.”
([Hamkins, 2012b], p426)
The key point here is the following: model-theoretic constructions are no longer
merely devices for showing relative consistency proofs (as was the case with Go¨del
and Cohen). Rather, such constructions are now used to show theorems about objects
that are of interest in their own right (rather than say, a number-theoretic fact about
proof codes). The emerging picture has been one in which the study of multiverses
and interrelations between models (such as embedding properties between mod-
els and their forcing extensions11) have become of central importance in set theory.
The Hamkinsian’s philosophical position, she argues, facilitates this kind of thought:
we can undergo the relevant constructions and study the models without worrying
whether or not such talk can be ‘simulated’ in the context of V .
Again the issues here are philosophically subtle, and there is a burgeoning lit-
erature on the subject.12 For the purposes of assessing the Hamkinsian on her own
terms then, we may simply take the above three issues to be the motivations she
would like to preserve in interpreting set theorists.
2 The algebraic and ontological interpretations of Hamkin-
sian Multiversism
Let us take stock. We are now in a position where we have a coarse grained state-
ment of a Hamkinsian position, and some considerations that motivate the view. In
this section, I argue that further examination reveals two aspects to her view, one
ontological and one algebraic. Later, I shall argue that the latter is the only tenable
interpretation of Hamkinsian Multiversism.
2.1 The ontological interpretation
The ontological interpretation is perhaps the more intuitive way of understanding
Hamkins’ view. Here we regard the view as providing an account of ontology and
reference. Such an interpretation is suggested by passages such as the following:
11See, for example, [Foreman, 2010].
12See, for example, [Koellner, 2013] and [Hamkins and Seabold, 2012].
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“I shall argue for a contrary [to Universism] position, the multiverse view,
which holds that there are diverse distinct concepts of set, each instan-
tiated in a corresponding set-theoretic universe, which exhibit diverse
set-theoretic truths. Each such universe exists independently in the same
Platonic sense that proponents of the universe view regard their universe
to exist.” ([Hamkins, 2012b], pp 416-417)
So, the picture offered is one on which each universe exists fully independently
in reality, much as a Universist asserts the full and mind-independent existence of
her V .13 This provides us with an account of ontology, the multiverse (of ZFC) is
constituted14 by models of first-order ZFC. While there may be practical or per-
sonal reasons for preferring one universe over another, no one universe is especially
privileged ontologically.
Given that she now has a picture of ontology, it is incumbent upon the Hamkin-
sian to provide an account of epistemology. In particular, one would like to know
how reference behaves, and its relationship to truth and knowledge.
The question of reference is important on this interpretation of Hamkinsian Mul-
tiversism. Crucially she wishes to hold that the study of set-theoretic properties
consists in their behaviour within the Multiverse, and that questions of truth are
substantiated but a real ontology. For example, Hamkins writes:
“The multiverse view is one of higher-order realism–Platonism about
universes–and I defend it as a realist position asserting the actual exis-
tence of the alternative set-theoretic universes into which our mathemat-
ical tools have allowed us to glimpse.” ([Hamkins, 2012b], p417)
and
“set theorists [when performing model-theoretic constructions] move with
agility from one model to another.” ([Hamkins, 2012b], p418)
A natural way to understand claims of the above kind is through reference: when
performing a model-theoretic construction, we start with some relevant universe
V , and shift reference to a different V ′. How then does this reference to different
universes within the multiverse occur? Hamkins is nowhere explicit, but does say
the following:
“Often the clearest way to refer to a set concept is to describe the uni-
verse of sets in which it is instantiated, and in this article I shall simply
identify a set concept with the model of set theory to which it gives rise.”
([Hamkins, 2012b], p417)
13It should be noted that the analogy is not total. For instance, a Universist is likely to deny the existence
of V as a set for reasons of paradox. On Hamkins’ view, however, any particular V is a set in a taller model.
Nonetheless, one can see the similarity, both assert that the subject matter of mathematics is constituted
by mind-independent entities.
14Exactly which models of first-order ZFC is a subtle issue, and one I shall not consider here. Hamkins
specifies (in addition to his broad picture) a list of Multiverse Axioms, designed to axiomatise movement
within the Multiverse. Of note is that (within a particular V ) the collection of all models of ZFC does not
satisfy the Multiverse Axioms, though the collection of all computably saturated models of ZFC does: see
[Hamkins, 2012b] and [Gitman and Hamkins, 2011] for details. These subtleties are unimportant for the
discussion here, no matter what the axioms taken to characterise the Multiverse are, the arguments carry
over immediately.
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Thus we have a picture of reference on which each model is correlated with a
set concept, and we refer this concept through a description. An immediate ques-
tion is what expressive resources we may employ in providing such a description.
Hamkins is very clear: any such description is first-order. The key issue here is that
this account of reference to concepts, identified with models, via description results
in a very tight link between understanding and reference to ontology. Regarding cate-
goricity theorems, he says the following:
“The point is that a second-order categoricity argument, even just for the
natural numbers, requires one to operate in a context with a background
concept of set. And so although it may seem that saying “1, 2, 3, . . . and
so on,” has to do only with a highly absolute concept of finite number,
the fact that the structure of the finite numbers is uniquely determined
depends on our much murkier understanding of which subsets of the
natural numbers exist.” ([Hamkins, 2012b], p428)
Here, we see Hamkins argue that indeterminacy in the object language transfers
to the metalanguage: if we are unable to pin down objects using our first-order set
theory, and our second-order15 theories are dependent upon an understanding of
the former, then a second-order metalanguage is also indeterminate. Hence, for the
Hamkinsian, we are always confined to first-order descriptions.16
Could the Hamkinsian hold the metalanguage fixed? While there is no logical
contradiction in doing so, we shall assume that she accepts indeterminacy in her
metalanguage (and indeed metametalanguage et cetera). There are two reasons for
this choice. First, we are interested in Multiversism in its most radical form, and
so would like to examine the case where the metalanguage is also indeterminate.
Second, to hold the metalanguage determinate seems anathema to the Hamkinsian’s
dialectical position with respect to the Universist. Recall that some of the main mo-
tivations for rejecting the Universist position were his acceptance of seemingly ad
hoc interpretations of model-theoretic constructions (especially forcing) for creating
alternative set-theoretic universes. An insistence on the determinacy of the metalan-
guage when the object language is taken to be highly non-absolute would thus seem
like her own set of ad hoc assumptions. This is especially so given that the standard
way of characterising the metalanguage is in set theory itself. Further, and more
conclusively, if the Hamkinsian were to baldly assert determinateness of the meta-
language, it seems that her opponent would be perfectly entitled to likewise claim
that his understanding of various set-theoretic concepts are determinate (such as the
power set operation) opening the door to categoricity arguments and a rejection of
Hamkinsian Multiversism.
We can then see that talk of moving from one universe to another cannot be,
strictly speaking, what is occurring on a given occasion of set-theoretic reference.
For, by several metatheoretic results, first-order theories are completely unable to
precisely determine their objects up to isomorphism.17 Hence, we lack the concep-
tual resources to pin down a single universe precisely. We do not, therefore, literally
‘pick out’ a model, perform a construction on said model, and move to a different
15Or, indeed, any substantial increase in expressive resources in the metalanguage (e.g. ancestral logic).
16This is not to say that second-order set theory is meaningless for the Hamkinsian. Rather, the interpre-
tation of the second-order variables is dependent upon background concept of set, and so indeterminacy
in the first-order language of ZFC carries over to the second-order language.
17For example, the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem Theorems entail that if a theory has an infinite model, then it has
(clearly non-isomorphic) models of every infinite cardinality. The existence of non-well-founded models
(an immediate consequence of the Compactness Theorem for first-order theories) is another good example
of clearly non-isomorphic models of theories that are the same with respect to first-order satisfaction.
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model: we lack sufficient and determinate conceptual resources to accomplish such a
task. One way to understand Hamkins’ suggestion is to hold that we refer to several
universes at once via description.18 Since second-order resources are indeterminate
as to interpretation of the variables, these descriptions are first-order, and as such do
not specify any one universe precisely. Set-theoretic reference within the multiverse
should thus not be thought of as referring to a particular set-theoretic possibility and
then moving from this via a construction, but rather identifying a ‘cloud’ of universes
within the multiverse all of which satisfy some particular sentences of first-order set
theory. We then perform a model-theoretic construction, relative to each model in
the cloud, which shifts focus to a different cloud of universes within the multiverse.
We can then still hold on to our understanding of the practice of set theory, it is just
that ‘V ’ refers to some (contextually fixed) collection of universes, rather than a sin-
gle one, and construction is relative to each background. This then moves us to a
different cloud of universes satisfying different sentences.
Similar views receive currency in the philosophical literature, and have been seen
to solve philosophical problems. For example [Balaguer, 1998] sketches a similar
philosophical view (his affinity with which Hamkins notes19) on which any coherent
first-order description correctly describes part of mathematical reality. In particular
Balaguer sees his view as solving the following classic philosophical problem with
objects-based realist accounts:
[Benacerraf, 1973] (Benacerraf’s Problem) How can we refer to mathe-
matical objects at all if we cannot come into direct epistemic contact with
them?
Of course, the exact exegesis to be given to this problem is a thorny philosophical
issue in itself. Benacerraf’s original statement relies explicitly on a causal theory of
knowledge, an account few would now accept. However, we may take the problem
as well posed: given an acceptance of realism and the existence of mathematical
objects as mind-independent, aspatio-temporal entities, how do we gain knowledge
of such objects?
The question is of particular interest for the Hamkinsian, as it presents a possible
advantage over the Universist. While Universists have proposed various solutions to
the problem, either by denying it is actually a problem ([Maddy, 2011]), providing a
categoricity argument ([McGee, 1997], [Martin, 2001]), or positing a Go¨delian faculty
of intuition ([Go¨del, 1947]), all are fraught with controversy. If she can motivate the
claim that she has a solution to the above problem, then this would place her in a far
stronger dialectical position.
Balaguer sees his view as responding to the following characterisation of Benac-
erraf’s problem:
“in order to salvage their view, mathematical platonists have to explain
how human beings can acquire knowledge of abstract mathematical ob-
jects, given that they are not capable of coming into any sort of contact
with such objects, that is, receiving any information from such objects.”
([Balaguer, 1998], p48)
To which he responds as follows:
18It should be noted that he states that this is only ‘often’ how reference is achieved. However, nowhere
else is he explicit about exactly how reference occurs.
19See, for example, his presentation in [Hamkins, 2012a].
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“Thus, in connection with the epistemological problem, the point is this:
if I know that some theory truly describes part of the mathematical realm,
then I have knowledge of that realm, regardless of whether it describes a
unique part of that realm” ([Balaguer, 1998], p50)
The similarity with Hamkins’ view is clear: we have first-order descriptions that
(non-uniquely) identify part of the mathematical realm. Balaguer and Hamkins’
positions are thus similar in content whilst motivated by different considerations.
Balaguer attacks an epistemological problem concerning knowledge of mathemati-
cal objects in light of Benacerraf’s Problem, whereas Hamkins is motivated by wor-
ries (both epistemological and ontological) arising from the vast proliferation of set-
theoretic models. Common to both the ontological interpretation of Hamkinsian
Multiversism and Balaguer’s view is that knowledge of mathematical objects can be
accounted for by understanding first-order reference to apply to part of the mathe-
matical realm.
Comparison of the ontological interpretation of Hamkinsian Multiversism and
Universism is thus particularly interesting from a philosophical perspective, because
both are paradigms of realism. Each seeks to underpin mathematical practice and
truth by having sets be abstract objects in ontologically good standing. However,
both views have very different conceptions of the nature of the subject matter of
set theory, a fact which is manifest in their attitudes to the bivalence of statements
such as the Continuum Hypothesis. The Universist should think that CH has a
determinate truth value, holding as they do that there is a single determinate maxi-
mal universe of sets to which we may precisely refer. However for the Multiversist
there is no fact of the matter whether or not CH is true, some set-theoretic back-
grounds that satisfy ZFC also satisfy CH , and some do not. In particular any uni-
verse V has a forcing extension V [G] (in which no cardinals are collapsed) such that
V [G] |= ZFC + ¬CH and a different extension V [H] (adding no new reals) such
that V [H] |= ZFC + CH . Asking “Is CH true?” is comparable to asking whether
the Parallels Postulate is true in geometry: just as the Parallels Postulate depends on
with which geometry one is concerned, soCH depends on the particular set-theoretic
background under consideration.
2.2 The algebraic interpretation
The ontological intepretation is not, however, the only way of interpreting Hamkins’
view. We begin by noting a difference between two kinds of mathematics. On the one
hand we have particular mathematics such as number theory and analysis, where we
(at least prima facie) aim to talk about some particular structure. On the other hand,
we have algebraic mathematics, on which we explicitly are not concerned with any
particular objects, rather we examine what will be possible on a given structure with
certain properties.
To see the distinction more clearly, consider a paradigm case of particular mathe-
matics such as number theory. Here we aim to talk about properties held by individ-
ual numbers and the natural number structure. For example, we can claim that the
number 7 is prime, and in so doing make a claim about properties held by a particu-
lar position in the structure N. On the other hand, a paradigm example of algebraic
mathematics is group theory, where we study the basic properties of any structure
satisfying the group axioms (and possibly extensions thereof). We are not interested
in what the objects are, rather we concern ourselves with what will hold and can
be constructed given that we are presented with a structure with certain properties.
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Hamkins, however, occasionally argues that on his view set theory is more of a piece
with disciplines such as group theory:
“While group theorists study groups, ring theorists study rings and topol-
ogists study topological spaces, set theorists study the models of set the-
ory.” ([Hamkins, 2012b], p418)
How should we understand the practice of algebraic mathematics? It is tempt-
ing to understand it in a similar way to the ontological interpretation of Hamkinsian
Multiversism: by providing descriptions of what it takes to be a group or a ring
we might be said to describe part of the mathematical realm. Certainly, one could
take this view of algebraic mathematics, and in doing so would collapse the alge-
braic interpretation of Hamkinsian Multiversism into the ontological interpretation.
However, especially as the end argument will be that the ontological interpretation
is philosophically incoherent, we shall see if there is an alternative understanding
available.
A different way to interpret algebraic mathematics such as group theory views
the disciplines not as concerned with description and reference, but rather axiomatis-
ing facts about what holds and can be constructed relative to certain kinds of math-
ematical structure. In the case of group theory, if we take a group G, we are able to
investigate (a) what holds on G, and (b) what we can construct from G. For exam-
ple, we know that if G has a prime number of elements, then G is cyclic. Further,
we can construct new objects from G. Taking quotients, direct products, semidirect
products, wreath products, direct limits, inverse limits et cetera are most naturally
understood as methods of constructing new groups from old. We can understand
these operations not as making any claims about existence and reference, but rather
telling us what will happen given some objects endowed with some operations and
relations.
The idea then for the Hamkinsian is to hold that her view is not concerned with
existence and reference but rather explaining what will hold and can be constructed
given some structure that satisfies ZFC. We do not make any claims as to what
exists within the Multiverse, rather it is seen as an intuitive picture to facilitate
algebraic reasoning concerning sets. Given a structure, the Multiverse View tells
us how we can move from this structure. Indeed it is natural to view some of
the technical achievements of the Multiversist programme in this light. For ex-
ample, we can understand the project of providing the modal logic of forcing in
[Hamkins and Loewe, 2008] as an attempt to explain how we can move from a ground
model using forcing constructions.
It should be noted that prima facie the two interpretations are not in conflict with
one another. Indeed, it is very natural to adjoin the algebraic interpretation to the
ontological interpretation in providing an account of exactly what the Hamkinsian
is advocating concerning set-theoretic practice. Despite this, the rest of the paper
will argue that the ontological interpretation is unsatisfactory (without a softening
of the position). Nonetheless, we shall see that the algebraic understanding of the
Hamkinsian is not thereby threatened.
3 Relativism and the referential regress
Let us return then to the ontological interpretation of Hamkinsian Multiversism. Re-
call that on this interpretation we refer via description to a cloud of universes within
the Multiverse.
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We should first note that Hamkins is committed to a very strong form of rela-
tivism: what sets exist and the kinds of model-theoretic constructions possible are
relative to a particular initial set-theoretic background. Given this, the extent of the
multiverse is also indeterminate until a particular point is chosen. This is a fact of
which Hamkins is well aware:
“although it is better to understand these descriptions [forcing et cetera]
as relative construction methods, since the resulting universe described
depends on the initial universe in which the constructions are under-
taken...one does not expect the properties of the multiverse to be avail-
able when undertaking an internal construction within a universe. That
is, we do not expect to see the whole multiverse from within any partic-
ular universe.” ([Hamkins, 2012b], p417)
That is to say, the way the Multiverse itself appears differs according to the uni-
verse in which one starts. One immediate response to the Hamkinsian would then
be the following argument. We might note that, as the extent of the multiverse is
determined by set-theoretic background, the following statement is true:
“We cannot quantify over the whole multiverse.”
Now, this particular statement is clearly true for Hamkins. Let ‘extentV1 of the
multiverse’ denote the extent of the multiverse from the point of view of V1. We
know that for any extentV1 of the multiverse, there is a different extentV2 of the mul-
tiverse that contains universes not in the extentV1 of the multiverse. Thus there are
always universes in ‘the whole multiverse’ over which we cannot quantify given
the fixing of some background concept of set V . The statement is, at first blush,
somewhat paradoxical: it violates its own content by quantifying over the whole
multiverse.
We should note, however, that such a paradox is merely intuitive and informal.
Since there is no known system in which the notion of the whole Multiverse is for-
malisable, claims about the Multiverse are formulated in terms of set models within
some initial starting background V . Thus, with respect to formal analysis, there is
no direct contradiction. For, within some V we can perfectly well quantify over ‘the
whole Multiverse’: V simply takes the Multiverse to be some models satisfying the
Multiverse Axioms. Given the lack of direct contradiction, we might question the
extent to which the Hamkinsian Multiversist will find such arguments convincing.
Further, such relativistic paradoxes are well worn in the literature on absolute gen-
erality. I will not, therefore, re-examine those issues here. However, I will press a
different worry on exactly how the Multiversist is able to secure reference to any
particular universe within an extentV of the multiverse.
We begin by observing that the model-theoretic constructions possible are de-
pendent upon the particular background of set in which one finds oneself, let it be
denoted by ‘V1’. Thus V1 determines the extentV1 of the multiverse. Given this, the
exact cloud c1 picked out by a given utterance of set-theoretic statements is in fact
dependent on V1: if the extent of the multiverse had been different, we would have
picked out a different cloud. But as it was acknowledged earlier, picking out an exact
universe (V1) is impossible as we are restricted to referring to models using concepts
expressed as first-order axiomatisations. Thus it turns out that the initial selection of
c1 was dependent on a prior selection of a different cloud c2. Again though, selec-
tion of c2 is dependent on the extent of the multiverse, and hence on selection of a
different universe V2 to determine the extentV2 of the multiverse. But reference to V2
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is impossible, and hence this should really be analysed as reference to some cloud
c3. It is clear that there is no end to this process, and we have a non-well-founded
dependency chain.
Clearly a referential regress looms. Our reference depends upon an infinite de-
scending sequence of cloud and universe specifications. Normally (though not al-
ways), in philosophical discussion, the production of a regress in a situation where
one would expect grounding (such as with respect to reference) is sufficient to show
that the view faces some serious difficulties. However, it is one thing to show that a
regress looms, and another to show that it is vicious in nature. This is particularly
so for the case at hand as, by and large, the Multiversist is happy with the idea of
non-well-foundedness. Indeed, a central tenet of the Multiverse View states that ev-
ery universe is non-well-founded from the perspective of a different universe.20 So,
is the regress vicious?
One might think that it is not, in fact, a vicious regress. While one might worry
that in the case of reference a non-well-founded dependency structure is unaccept-
able, there are examples that show that this is not implausible. Imagine, for example,
a non-actual, non-atomic, possible world composed entirely of ever smaller parti-
cles of increasing fundamentality. Let ‘o1’ denote some object in this world. One
might think that we successfully refer to o1 in virtue of successfully referring to all
its smaller parts of the next level of greater fundamentality o′2, o′′2 , o′′′2 , .... We might
then think that we refer to these in virtue of referring to all their parts of the next level
of fundamentality o′3, o′′3 , o′′′3 , ... and so on. Here, the non-well-founded dependency
structure of reference is not obviously vicious.
However, epistemological considerations tell us that in the case of the Multiver-
sist it is indeed a vicious regress. Recall the Multiversist’s position regarding the
link between ontology and concepts. There it was noted that the Multiversist thought
that every model of set theory constituted a set concept. Now, it was then noted that,
by the Multiversist’s own lights, this could not quite be the correct story. The im-
possibility of singling out individual set-theoretic backgrounds meant that it was far
more accurate to say that a set concept is related to a particular cloud of universes
within the multiverse. However, now it has been shown that such an occasion of
reference requires picking out infinitely many such clouds. The problem is now very
serious: given that there is a regress it seems that we are employing infinitely many
concepts on a given occasion of reference. The idea that we could possess infinitely
many concepts is highly controversial (if not downright absurd), let alone employ
infinitely many concepts in referring. The situation in the non-atomic world is sub-
stantially disanalagous: there we were only using one concept to refer (the concept
that sufficed to pick out o1), it just happened to be the case that this reference had a
non-well-founded dependency chain.
Is there a way for the Multiversist to modify their view such that they can avoid
this problem? I see two main ways of achieving this goal:
1. Modify her view so that the regress is no longer vicious.
2. Modify her view in such a way as to prevent the generation of the regress at
all.
What are the prospects for the first option? If we analyse the non-atomic uni-
verse, we can see that the need for infinitely many concepts avoided in virtue of the
fact that the speaker at the world did not need to possess the concepts for the more
fundamental objects in order to secure reference: in this case reference to o1 was
20This is known as the Well-foundedness Mirage. See [Hamkins, 2012b], p439.
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achieved via direct contact with it and all its parts of greater fundamentality. The
need for infinitely many concepts is precisely what is required for the Multiversist,
in order to know about which cloud we are talking, we must first know what other
clouds we are fixing in order to secure reference to the initial cloud, and every such
cloud corresponds to a concept. The Hamkinsian could then possibly avoid the vi-
ciousness of the regress by denying the link between concepts and ontology: they
could deny that every cloud corresponds to a set concept.
This response is deeply problematic for familiar reasons in the philosophy of
mathematics. In the case of the non-atomic universe, the speaker has direct contact
with objects of the kind to which she is referring. This is precisely not so with the
proposed account of reference in higher set theory: the way we refer to these entities
is entirely through description. If we deny that we have a concept for referring to
each cloud, there would be a point at which we did not have a fixed background,
and hence reference would break down. Denying the link between concepts and
ontology undercuts the Multiversist’s initial starting point for reference.
The second option then looks slightly more promising: we should modify the
Multiverse View to prevent the regress getting going at all. Recall that the catalyst for
the regress was the fact that the extent of the Multiverse itself was relative, this then
infected our reference to any particular cloud. Two responses present themselves:
either we can argue that this sequence of reference nonetheless has a stopping point
despite the indeterminacy in the extent of the Multiverse, or alternatively prevent
the regress by delimiting absolutely the extent of the Multiverse.
How could we accomplish the former? Instead of maintaining that the extent of
the Multiverse is dependent on where we start, she could instead say that its extent
is indeterminate in virtue of being so dependent. On a given occasion of set-theoretic
reference, while there may be a potential regress, we simply do stop somewhere, it is
just that we do not know where we have stopped. The Multiverse is then fixed from
this particular stopping point, which may be different on any particular occasion.
Certainly, there is no contradiction in asserting this. There is nothing that she
has said that prevents her from maintaining that we simply end up referring to a
particular universe to act as our reference frame for talking about the Multiverse.
Such a response is, nonetheless, highly dialectically ineffective. We should be mind-
ful here of the Hamkinsian’s complaint against the Universist that he is ad hoc in his
disavowal of the existence of legitimate universes other than V . For, the Hamkin-
sian can give no particular reason to focus on one stopping point rather than another
(nor any determinately understood language in which we could try to differentiate
stopping points). This process of stopping at some V would thus be to admit her
own ad hoc assumptions. Further, such a response would undermine the purported
advantage the Multiversist wishes to establish over the Universist concerning Benac-
erraf’s Problem. Salient here is the fact that the Hamkinsian sees herself as providing
a response to this central issue by accounting for reference through description with-
out positing the existence of non-natural mental powers (as often Go¨del is accused
of doing). However, the response that we simply stop somewhere (without being
able to give any reason for a particular stopping point) seems, like Go¨del, to ascribe
unexplained powers to the human mind.
Thus a preferable option is to be able to genuinely single out particular set-
theoretic backgrounds as more privileged than others, thereby securing the non-
relativity of the model-theoretic constructions. In order to do this, we must have
some model or models privileged within the multiverse, such that the key model-
theoretic constructions are absolute with respect to these models. In turn, to facil-
itate this, we require a stock of absolutely understood concepts, sufficiently rich in
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character that we can identify determinately a class of set-theoretic backgrounds.
The key point to take away from the discussion is the following: in any philos-
ophy of mathematics that tries to make sense of a multiverse picture of set theory
as concerned with reference, there is likely to be an element of relativism of certain
concepts. However, there is a limit to how far this relativism can go. In particular we
need to be precise about which universes (off the bat) are to count as privileged, and
in doing so will have to specify a list of concepts that we are simply taking to have
absolute significance in order to restrict our class of models. Moreover, this stock of
concepts must be sufficiently rich to allow the relevant model-theoretic techniques
to be absolutely specified, and the multiverse given precise limit. The acceptance of
‘any particular’ first-order model as a legitimate universe results in a relativism so
strong that it cripples our ability to refer at all.
4 Relativism and metalogic
Consequences of this relativism can be pushed further to create more problems for
the Multiversist. Due to the centrality of the claim that no-one universe of sets is
more ontologically privileged than another for the Hamkinsian, several key concepts
that many would take to be determinate turn out to not be so. Two good examples
are the following21:
Well-foundedness Mirage. Every universe V is non-well-founded from
the perspective of another universe W .
Countability Principle. Every universe V is countable from the perspec-
tive of another universe W .
Why do the above principles hold? The Well-foundedness Mirage follows from
several metatheoretic results: we know that there are models of ZFC on which the
‘membership relation’ is non-well-founded from the perspective of the ‘standard’
model.22 Many of these models will be able to see (from the perspective of their
‘membership relation’) a descending ‘membership’ sequence in what we currently
take to be the ‘standard’ model, and hence view the current model as non-well-
founded.23 In turn the Countability Principle holds because any cardinal can be
collapsed to ℵ0 using forcing arguments.
The ramifications for the Multiverse View are both striking and immediate. Any
properties that are not absolute between all models of ZFC turn out to be inherently
dependent on our background concept of set. In this sense, the Multiversist’s rela-
tivism about set-theoretic background extends to a relativism about many concepts
ordinarily taken to be well understood. This is certainly controversial, but a feature
of the view Hamkins is happy to embrace: he feels it makes sense of our experience
with the diverse the set-theoretic possibilities provided by the model-theoretic con-
structions. However, we should be mindful of exactly how far this relativism goes.
In particular, the relativism even applies to our understanding of natural numbers.
Hamkins says the following:
21[Hamkins, 2012b], pp438-439.
22Examples of this sort include the Mostowski Collapse Lemma, Compactness Theorem for first-order
theories, and Ultrapower Construction (the former implies the existence of non-well-founded models
indirectly, the latter two by explicit construction).
23The astute reader will notice that the explanation given here is riddled with ‘scare quotes’. There is
good reason for this, even the notion of standardness itself is relative for the Hamkinsian Multiversist.
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“So why are mathematicians so confident that there is an absolute con-
cept of finite natural number, independent of any set-theoretic concerns,
when all of our categoricity arguments are explicitly set-theoretic and re-
quire one to commit to a background concept of set? My long-term expec-
tation is that technical developments will eventually arise that provide a
forcing analogue for arithmetic, allowing us to modify diverse models
of arithmetic in a fundamental and flexible way, just as we now mod-
ify models of set theory by forcing, and this development will challenge
our confidence in the uniqueness of the natural number structure, just as
set-theoretic forcing has challenged our confidence in a unique absolute
set-theoretic universe.” ([Hamkins, 2012b], p428)
Here we see Hamkins express doubts that there is any determinate concept of
natural number, on the grounds that any attempt to determine the structure of the
natural numbers up to isomorphism will have to use resources beyond first-order,
and hence will be dependent on the background notion of set. This lack of confidence
in an absolute concept of natural number, though it brings out another controversial
aspect of the view, is fine as far as it goes. However, the thesis that the natural
numbers are a relative concept points to a familiar objection to views that hold that
purely first-order theories are the only legitimate expressive resources. We begin
with the following well-known theorem:
Theorem 1. Let S be a set of first-order sentences and let φ(x) be any
first-order formula containing only x free. If, for every natural number n,
there is a model of S in which the extension of φ contains at least n-many
objects, then there is a model of S in which the extension of φ contains
infinitely-many objects.
The theorem (a quick consequence of the Compactness Theorem) has the follow-
ing immediate consequence: no purely first-order theory can ever pin down the no-
tion of finiteness up to isomorphism.24 Now real problems are beginning to emerge
for the Multiversist. For, the formal framework of her view is to study the Mul-
tiverse through analysing the models of ZFC. Hence, she would like there to be
a well-understood and determinate notion of proof and well-formed formula. Without
these, the notions of a proof in ZFC and indeed ZFC itself are not even determi-
nate. It is therefore indeterminate what the Multiversist is even asserting in saying
that universes are models of ZFC, and her formal framework breaks down.
Again, the Hamkinsian could respond by arguing that there is a determinate no-
tion of natural number and finitude relative to an initial starting V . Every V thinks
that it has the standard natural numbers and well-formed formulae. The relevant
model-theoretic constructions thus go through relative to that background. Later,
we shall see that the intuition behind this thought helps to clarify the algebraic in-
terpretation. For the moment, however, this response falls flat on the ontological
interpretation. There we are concerned with attempting to describe and refer to part
of the mathematical realm. Asserting “ZFC” gets us nowhere if ZFC itself is inde-
terminate: it fails to tell us anything about the way mathematical reality is as it is not
clear what is being asserted.
Again, we might take this as indicative of the fact that certain notions need to
be taken to be absolute. It has long been noted that certain mathematical concepts
24Many of these considerations, and in particular the above theorem, are discussed in Shapiro’s seminal
[Shapiro, 1991]. For a discussion of the similarities and differences between indeterminacy in the notion
of finiteness and the explicitly set-theoretic case, the reader is directed to [Field, 2003].
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are necessary for the expression of metalogical definitions.25 By adhering to a very
strong form of relativism, the Multiversist undercuts the very concepts required to
properly express her own view.
5 Giving up on the Benacerrafian Challenge: a response
for the Hamkinsian Multiversist through the algebraic
interpretation
We have seen two problems for the ontological interpretation of the Hamkinsian
Multiversist, one concerning a referential regress and a second concerning difficul-
ties with metalogic. A solution was outlined: soften the radical nature of the view
and take some notions to be determinately understood. I want to now consider a
different approach: reject the ontological interpretation and simply continue with
the algebraic interpretation. This will, however, force her to give up her view as a
response to Benacerraf’s Problem.
The solution in question involves rejecting that Hamkins’ view should be con-
strued as concerned with ontology and reference, and rather view set theory as an
algebraic enterprise. Recall the options presented for avoiding the referential regress:
1. Modify the view so that the regress is no longer vicious.
2. Modify the view in such a way as to prevent the generation of the regress at
all.
We can take option (2.), but rather than trying to maintain an account of reference,
simply give up on set theory as the kind of enterprise in which we try to refer. Re-
call our paradigmatically algebraic discipline: group theory. As noted earlier, when
reasoning with group theory we do not take ourselves to be referring to any partic-
ular group, rather we are simply say what will hold and be possible on any given
structure that satisfies the group axioms.
We can view Hamkins’ project in a similar light. Rather than taking him to be
solving a problem of reference through description, we can take him to be telling us
what will be satisfied and possible on any structure that satisfies the ZFC axioms.
We make no claim as to the universes that exist, and indeed cannot speak about the
extent of or situate ourselves within the Multiverse. We can, however, say that given
some structure V that satisfies ZFC certain things will hold and can be constructed
relative to V . It is then simply a bad question to ask which universe we are in or
what universes there are, much as asking which exact objects one is talking about in
group theory is misguided.
How does this response solve the earlier problems? With respect to metalogic, it
is true that on the algebraic conception we do not have a determinate understand-
ing of natural number, finiteness, well-formed formula, or proof, independent of
set-theoretic background. For, while any background V in which we find ourselves
provably holds itself to be standard (with the standard natural numbers and the stan-
dard well-formed formulae and proofs) we can easily construct a universe that views
V as non-standard. The important point from the perspective of the working set the-
orist is that any proofs or well-formed formulae they talk about will have the normal
properties relative to any particular universe of sets in which they may find them-
selves, and hence the normal constructions will be possible from that background. In
25Certainly, at least since, [Shapiro, 1991].
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this sense, the attempted response on behalf of the Hamkinsian in the previous sec-
tion was on the right track. However, by holding that her view makes claims about
an ontology to be described, the Hamkinsian Multiversist found herself in trouble,
she then needed ZFC to have determinate content in order to say something mean-
ingful about the mathematical reality. Here, since our claims are already explicitly
relative, there is no such problem. We are not making any claim about mathematical
reality, rather we simply state what can be done from within a particular structure.
Moreover, the issue of reference is dealt with very trivially. Under the algebraic
interpretation, we do not take set theory as the sort of enterprise that is concerned
with referring to objects. Rather it is seen as providing an intuitive framework that
underlies an algebraic method of thinking. This then allows us to understand what
will be possible on a given structure with certain properties. Thus the problem of
reference dissolves: we are not even making the appropriate kinds of claims to be
assessed for reference.
However, we should note that Balaguer’s response to Benacerraf’s Problem is
utterly abandoned by this characterisation of Hamkinsian Multiversism. First, on
this account of the enterprise of set theory the response seems utterly unnecessary,
it is the wrong kind of question to be asking about set-theoretic practice. Set theory
here is rather viewed as an algebraic discipline not concerned with being ‘about’ any
objects. Second, the characterisation also clearly undercuts the response in virtue of
the acceptance of a thoroughgoing relativism with respect to metalogic. This makes
it impossible to talk about ‘reference via description’ independent of assuming that
one is already situated in some V , from the outside perspective it is not determinate
what would even constitute a ‘description’ given the indeterminateness of formulae.
Conclusion
We have seen that Hamkins’ Multiverse View appears to present a fascinating and
elegant way of providing a background ontology for model-theoretic constructions.
There appear to be two different aspects to the view, one ontological and one alge-
braic. The ontological interpretation of the view is seen to commit the Multiversist
to a referential regress, vicious in virtue of the correlation of concepts with mod-
els. The problem is instructive for modern philosophical practice and shows that if
one wishes to have an account of reference in set theory, a stock of notions taken
to be absolute is required in order to secure a preferential class of models and de-
limit the multiverse. This is further seen with respect to metalogical definitions, as
their satisfactory statement requires certain notions (such as finitude) to be abso-
lutely understood. It is possible to maintain the Hamkinsian Multiverse perspective
by viewing set theory as a fundamentally algebraic enterprise, but this is at the cost
of a response to Benacerraf’s Problem and a view of set theory on which we are con-
cerned with ontology. While there are options open for the Hamkinsian, the moral is
clear: if one wishes to have reference to mathematical objects, then relativism has to
stop somewhere.
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